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POLITICAL LAWYERING, ONE PERSON AT A TIME:
THE CHALLENGE OF LEGAL WORK AGAINST
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FOR THE IMPACT
LITIGATION/CLIENT SERVICE DEBATE
Peter Margulies*t
The definition of political lawyering is one of the few matters on
which most right- and left-wing commentators agree. Right-wing critics
of the Legal Services Corporation (LSC), in the battle over the LSC's
budget, target the impact litigation pursued by LSC lawyers, that seeks
to change laws or policies in order to benefit poor people. Such law
reform efforts, according to right-wing commentators, amount to a
"political crusade by left-wing lawyers and political activists to hold up
middle-class taxpayers for unbounded income redistribution and welfare
schemes."' Left-wing commentators praise impact litigation, agreeing
with conservative critics of the LSC that impact litigation is political
lawyering, offering "potential for structural change."
2
Most right- and left-wing commentators also agree on what is not
political lawyering. Commentators on both sides assert that client service
work, which focuses not on law reform but on resolving individual client
* Peter Margulies (J.D. 1981, Columbia University, B.A. 1978, Colgate University) is
an Associate Professor and the Director of the Immigration Clinic at St. Thomas
University School of Law.
t I thank my colleagues at the Immigration Clinic, and the battered immigrant women
whom the Clinic represents. Thanks are also due Naomi Cahn, Joan Meier, and
Ellen Saideman, who have commented on a previous draft of this paper. In addition,
I have benefitted from ongoing conversations with Linda Mills.
1. Howard Phillips & Peter Ferrara, Hidden Costs of the Legal Services Corp., Wash.
Times, Apr. 23, 1995, at B4. Action in the Republican-controlled 104th Congress
reflects this conservative view. One bill before Congress mandates a 30% cut in the
LSC budget that will have the effect of withdrawing federal support for LSC "back-
up centers," which conduct training and impact litigation activities. See H.R. 2076,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). In addition, the bill bars the LSC from instituting
class actions against the Federal government and the states, challenging federal or
state regulations, or challenging welfare "reform" measures. H. R. 2076. This attack
on the LSC is part of a larger attack on programs for people living in poverty. See
Susan Bennett & Kathleen A. Sullivan, Disentitling the Poor: Waivers and Welfare "Re-
firm' 26 MIcH. J.L. REFORM 741 (1993) (critiquing efforts to reduce public
assistance to the poor).
2. Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism, 32
UCLA L Ray. 474, 617 (1985). Cf DAVID LuBaN, LAWMRs AND Jus-rcE (1988)
(offering progressive account of dilemmas in legal services practice).
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complaints, is "apolitical. "13 The lone voice in the current LSC funding
debate to argue against this consensus is Ralph Reed of the Christian
Coalition. He claims that client service work in the domestic relations
area is political, because LSC "'subsidizes divorce and illegitimacy' by
paying for the representation of indigents in domestic disputes."4
The premise of this Article is that, in his assertion that client service
work is political lawyering, Ralph Reed is right. Indeed, Gary Bellow
made a similar point about the political content of both impact litigation
and client service work in a classic article written almost twenty years
ago.5 Of course, Reed and Bellow are hardly ideological soulmates. Reed
disapproves of the political content of service work, while Bellow heartily
endorses it. On that point, this Article sides with Bellow. It employs the
example of domestic violence lawyering6 to demonstrate why Bellow and
3. See Abel, supra note 2, at 577. For the conservative view, see Marshall J. Breger,
Disqualification for Conflicts of Interest and the Legal Aid Attorney, 62 B.U. L. Rev.
1115, 1137-38 (1982) (contrasting choosing cases because of their "social signifi-
cance" with choosing cases where the lawyer is the attorney of individual clients
rather than "of the poor generally").
4. See Stephen Labaton, Back From the Brink, the Legal Services Corporation Discovers It's
in Danger Again, N.Y. Timm, Mar. 31, 1995, at A28 (quoting Ralph Reed).
5. Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, NLADA
BRIEFcASE, Aug. 1977, at 106.
6. Domestic violence lawyering includes a spectrum of tasks such as obtaining injunc-
tions against intimate violence; representing battered women in a variety of other civil
and criminal matters; and working with battered women's organizations. For perspec-
tives on domestic violence, see Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The
Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 V D. L Rav. 1041
(1991); Naomi Cahn & Joan Meier, Domestic Violence and Feminist Jurisprudence:
Towards a New Agenda, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 339 (1995); Kimberld Crenshaw,
Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women
of Color, 43 STA. L Rav. 1241 (1991); Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse
Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HAuv. WOM-
EN'S L.J. 57 (1984); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images ofBattered Women: Redefining
the Issue of Separation, 90 MIcH. L. Rev. 1 (1991); Peter Margulies, Representation
of Domestic Violence Survivors as a New Paradigm of Poverty Law: In Search ofAccess,
Connection, and Voice, 63 GEo. WAsH. L Rev. 1071 (1995); Joyce E. McConnell,
Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude, and the Thirteenth A mend-
ment, 4 YALE J.L & FEmiNSM 207 (1992); Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Under-
ground Integrating Psychological and Legal Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory
and Practice, 21 HoFsTrA L. Rav. 1295 (1993); Linda G. Mills, On the Other Side
ofSilence: Affective Lawyeringfor IntimateAbuse, 81 ComNL L. REv. - (forthcom-
ing 1996); Jane C. Murphy, Lawyering for Social Change: The Power of the Narrative
in Domestic Violence Law Reform, 21 HoFsTA L REv. 1243 (1993); Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Describing and Changing. Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of
Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WomN's RTs. L REP. 195 (1986). Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Womens
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Reed are correct that client service work has political content, and why
Bellow is right that such political content is central to providing legal
services to poor people.
This Article situates the impact litigation/client service debate as one
of three dichotomies which privilege detachment over connection in legal
practice. The other dichotomies in this trio divide the professional from
the personal and the public from the private.
Legal education teaches us that personal sentiment is dangerous
professionally,7 because emotion and personal commitment can cloud the
exercise of neutral professional judgment.' While public interest and
poverty lawyering aspire to the integration of professional goals and
personal commitments, these forms of lawyering can also dichotomize
the professional and the personal. Impact litigators, in particular, feel
tension between advancing a cause and safeguarding the interests of
individual clients.9 Indeed, this tension has abetted conservative attacks
on the legitimacy of impact litigation 0 and has spurred a debate within
progressive circles. A leading philosopher of legal ethics and public inter-
est law, David Luban, believes that the lawyer's "betrayal" of her client
Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L REV. 589 (1986) [hereinafter Schneider, Rights andPolitics];
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges ofFeminist Theory and
Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 520 (1992) [hereinafter Schnei-
der, Particularity and Gender]. For discussions of teaching about domestic violence
in law school clinical programs, see Susan Bryant & Maria Arias, Case Study: A
Battered Women's Rights Clinic: Designing a Clinical Program Which Encourages a
Problem-Solving Vision ofLauyering That Empowers Clients and Community, 42 WASH.
UJ. Uiu. & CoNrEMp. L. 207 (1992); Ann Shalleck, Clinical Contexts: Theory and
Practice in Law and Supervision, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 109 (1993-94).
Cf Beverly Horsburgh, Li6ing the Veil of Secrecy: Domestic Violence in the Jewish
Community, 18 HtAv. WozmN's L.J. 171 (1995).
7. See Elizabeth Schneider et al., Lesbians, Gays, and Feminists at the Bar: Translating
Personal Experience into Effective Legal Argment-A Symposium, 10 WOMEN'S RTs.
L. REP. 107, 115 (1988).
8. See ANTHONY T. KRONmAN, THE LOST IAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 131 (1993) (arguing that the lawyer must balance sympathy and detach-
ment). Clinical education can help students strike a balance which encompasses the
emotions of both dients and lawyers. See Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client
Within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1731, 1739-52 (1993). For general
discussions of dinical education, see Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building
an Ethic of Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 HA NGS L.J: 1175 (1992); Phyllis
Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral The Ethics ofFeminism and Clinical Education, 75
MiNN. L. REv. 1599 (1991); Kathleen A. Sullivan, Self-Disclosure, Separation, and
Students: Intimacy in the Clinical Relationship, 27 IND. L. R~v. 115 (1993).
9. See LuBAN, supra note 2, at 317-340.
10. See Breger, supra note 3.
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for the cause is in some cases required, not just permitted." Opposing
this view, Bellow and co-author Jeanne Kettleson place a higher priority
on the lawyer's relationship with her client, and are reluctant to permit,
let alone require, such manipulation.1
2
Lawyers representing domestic violence survivors experience different
tensions than do other public interest lawyers. The primary peril in this
area of practice is not the lawyer's betrayal of clients, but rather her over-
identification with them.13 Yet, as the pioneering domestic violence
lawyer and theorist Elizabeth Schneider notes, personal connection to
clients is central to domestic violence lawyering 1 4 Lawyers representing
survivors of domestic violence cannot heed legal education's directive "to
distrust our intuition, to hide who we are and to detach ourselves from
our experience of who we are."
15
Feminists, who have targeted the professional/personal split, also
critique the public/private distinction, which separates society into a male
realm of rational discourse on public issues such as electoral politics, and
a female realm of emotional, private issues which include the family.
16
Even the poverty law theorists of the past thirty years have accepted a
variant of the public/private distinction, attaching greater importance to
public benefits issues than to family law issues which reflect gender
inequality within the "private sphere." 17 In contrast, the struggle against
domestic violence requires that society lift the veil of the private to deal
with the gender inequality beneath.
This brings us back to the impact litigation/client service debate. 8
11. See LUBAN, supra note 2, at 317-40. Cf Stephen Ellmann, Lawyeringfor Justice in
a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 116 (1990) (reviewing LuBAN, LAwYERs
AND JUSTICE (1988)).
12. See Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and
Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REv. 337, 352 (1978).
13. See Meier, supra note 6, at 1351. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
14. Schneider et al., supra note 7, at 115.
15. Schneider et al., supra note 7, at 115.
16. See, e.g., Mursrw A. FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SExuAL FAMLY
156-57 (1995).
17. See Margulies, supra note 6.
18. A rich literature on lawyering recently has developed that seeks to move away from
dichotomies into a more creative exploration of context. See GEaAD P. L6pzz,
REBELLIOUS LAWYERING (1992); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEo. LJ.
2475 (1993); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 HAsrmcs L.J. 1039 (1992);
Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87
MICH. L. Rav. 2459 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The
Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 763 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, The
Vol. 3:493
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Because impact litigation can "make law," poverty lawyers and com-
mentators have viewed it as the most rational, efficient way to address
inequality.'9 In contrast, commentators have regarded client service as
offering little potential for social change and much risk of a lawyer
developing a disabling emotional involvement in client problems.2"
However, as Bellow noted in his classic piece, this view ignores the
Ethic of Care as an Ethic fr Lawyers, 81 GEo. L.J. 2665 (1993); Peter Margulies, Ac-
cess, Connection, and Voice: A Contextual Approach to Representing Senior Citizens of
Questionable Capacity, 62 FoiRDHAm L. Rnv. 1073 (1994); Peter Margulies, The
Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected A Civic Republican
View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 695 (1994);
Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case
Theory, 93 MICH. L. Rzv. 485 (1994); Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers
and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. PIrr. L. Rav. 723 (1991); Paul R.
Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering andDe Facto Guardians, 62 FoRDHAm L Ray. 1429
(1994); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism fr Lauyers, 104 HAnv. L. REv. 469 (1990);
Peter Margulies, Progressive Lauyering and Lost Traditions (reviewing Milner S. Ball,
The Word and the Law (1993); ANTHONY T. KRONmAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING
IDEALS OF THE LEuAL PROFESSION (1993)) 73 Tx. L. REV. 1139 (1995).
The contextual literature shares a critical, interdisciplinary perspective on law and
society with the new poverty lawyering literature, which views lawyer practices as
marginalizing clients and communities. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Essay: Defending
Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L REv. 1301 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive
Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE LJ. 2107 (1991)
[hereinafter Reconstructing Poverty Law Practice]; Ruth Buchanan & Louise G.
Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest
Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. R". L& Soc. CHANIGE 687 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordi-
nation, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G.,
38 BuFF. L Ray. 1 (1990); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity,
Excess, and Opposition, 94 COLum. L REV. 1721 (1994) (reviewing IAw's VIOLENCE
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992)). Cf Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the
Practice in Clinical Education and Scholarship, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1187 (1992) (arguing
that progressive academics studying lawyering risk remoteness from experience of
clients, lawyers, and judges); Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of
Practice, 43 HASTINGS UJ. 971 (1992) (making the same argument). For an impor-
tant early critical perspective on lawyering, see William H. Simon, Visions of Practice
in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. Rav. 469 (1984).
19. See Abel, supra note 2.
20. See, e.g., JACK KxAz, POOR PEopLE'S LAwYERS IN TANsrrIoN (1982). For cogent
studies of poverty law and lawyering, see MARTHa F. DAvis, BRUTAL NEED: ILAw s
AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MovamENT, 1960-1973 (1993). Cf Matthew Diller,
Poverty Lawyering in the Golden Age, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1401 (1995). I have explored
the relationship of domestic violence lawyering and poverty law in a forthcoming
piece. Margulies, supra note 6. For a recent analysis which questions the im-
pact/service dichotomy, see Marc Feldman, Political Lessons: Legal Services ftr the Poor,
83 GEO. UJ. 1529 (1995).
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transformative potential of service work's personal dimension.21 Ultimate-
ly, public interest lawyers "make law" not just by overcoming and creat-
ing precedents, but through the myriad ordinary interactions which
determine whether subordinated people have more power to affect their
futures. In client service work, lawyers work through these interactions
one case at a time.
Part I of this Article examines how domestic violence lawyering
liberates these crucial interactions from the "private sphere." Part II
discusses how domestic violence lawyering, with its focus on the links
between the ideology of patriarchy and affective issues in individual
clients' relationships, integrates the professional and the'personal. Part III
argues that the struggle against the pervasive ideology of patriarchy
transcends distinctions between impact and service work. In challenging
these dichotomies, domestic violence lawyering realizes Gary Bellow's
vision of a more engaged, less bureaucratic public interest law.
I. THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION
Domestic violence lawyering poses its most direct challenge to the
public/private distinction. Since domestic violence occurs in the tradi-
tionally private realm of the family, society has often marginalized it as
the product of "individual pathologies,"22 on the part of both batterers
and survivors. In fact, domestic violence is a global form of inequality,
generated by "shared social norms and conventions" 3 and buttressed by
disparate legal treatment.
Consider how the public norms of immigration law reinforce the
subjection of immigrant women.2 4 An important basis for legal immi-
21. Bellow, supra note 5.
22. Isabel Marcus, Reframing "Domestic Violence". Terrorism in the Home, in THE PUBLIC
NATURE op PRIVATE VIoLENCE: THE DiscovERY oF DOMESTIC ABUSE 11-24 (Martha
A. Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994).
23. Marcus, supra note 22, at 24.
24. For discussion of the predicament of battered immigrant women, see Janet M. Calvo,
Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: The Legacies of Coverture, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 593
(1991); Kimberld Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. Rsv. 1241 (1991); Schneider,
Particularity and Generality, supra note 6.
Congress has enacted special protections for this marginalized group. See 8
U.S.C.A. § 1186a(c)(4) (West Supp. 1995) (hardship waivers); Violence Against
Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Star. 1796 (1994) (self-petitioning and
suspension of deportation). For commentary on these remedies, see Deeana L. Jang,
[Vol. 3:493
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gration into the United States is family relationships, including mar-
riage.25 When a United States citizen marries an immigrant, the couple
typically must live together for two years,26 and the citizen spouse must
submit a petition shortly before the expiration of the two-year period,
seeking lawful permanent resident status for the immigrant spouse.27 A
waiver of these conditions is now available in cases of domestic vio-
lence."8 But because the waiver does not cover all cases, these immigra-
tion conditions become a framework for fear when the citizen starts to
abuse his immigrant spouse, knowing that she still depends on him for
her immigration status.
One example from the files of the St. Thomas University School of
Law Immigration Clinic illustrates how this fear can become a daily
ritual for immigrant women.29 The husband of one Immigration Clinic
client beat her repeatedly because she did not serve dinner at exactly 6:00
p.m. and because she had looked for a job. Our client became despon-
dent because of her husband's relentless physical abuse and his threats of
noncooperation regarding her immigration status. Ultimately, she at-
tempted suicide.
30
Caught in a Web: Immigrant Women and Domestic Violence, 28 CLEARNGHOUSE REv.
397 (1994).
25. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1151 (West 1970 & Supp. 1995).
26. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1186a (West Supp. 1995).
27. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1186a(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1995).
28. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1186a(c)(4)(c) (West Supp. 1995).
29. I also cited this example in Margulies, supra note 6.
30. Statistics illustrate the pervasiveness of the problem of domestic violence, not just for
immigrant women but for all women. "Domestic violence is the leading cause of
injury to women in the United States." Elena Salzman, Note, The Quincy District
Court Domestic Violence Prevention Program: A Model Legal Framework fir Domestic
Violence Intervention, 74 B.U. L. REv. 329, 329 (1994). We can infer from statistics
that two to four million women suffer abuse every year, yielding an average of one
incident of abuse every 12 seconds. Salzman, supra, at 329. Between 21% and 34%
of all women will suffer physical assault by an intimate male as adults. See MARY P.
Koss ET AL., No SAFE HAVEN: MALE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AT HOME, AT
WORK, AND IN THE CoMmuNrrv 41, 42 (1994). One authoritative study found that
three out of every 100 women surveyed reported that their husbands had "severely
assaulted" them during the previous year: the women had been "punched, kicked,
choked, hit with an object, beaten up, threatened with a knife or a gun, or had a
knife or gun used on them." Koss, supra, at 43. Domestic violence is the cause of
homelessness for 50% of homeless women. See Ellen L. Bassuk, Social and Economic
Hardships ofHomeless and Other Poor Women, 63 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 340, 345
(1993); Angela Browne, Family Violence and Homelessness: The Relevance of Trauma
Histories in the Lives of Homeless Women, 63 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHATRY 370, 376
(1993); Gretchen P. Mullins, The Battered Woman and Homelessness, 3 BROOK. J.L.
1996]
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The use of immigration law as a weapon against battered immigrant
women is only one example of how public norms shape ostensibly
private violence. Other examples include the reluctance of law enforce-
ment officials to arrest, detain, and prosecute batterers;31 the lack of
financial and interpersonal support for women who seek to leave abusive
relationships; 32 and the tendency of courts to overlook domestic violence
when making custody determinations.3 3 In addition, the traditional
marginalization of family law issues in federal law and federal jurisdiction
hampers responses to domestic violence. Domestic violence often assumes
an interstate character when survivors flee to another state or when
abusers seek an out-of-state divorce and child custody decree.34 While
reform is proceeding in each of these areas,35 each reflects public determi-
nations, tacit or active, about the relative priority of women's claims.
The challenge to the public/private distinction posed by domestic
violence work also suggests the need for a shift in the focus of poverty
law. Poverty law theorists typically have devoted most attention to public
benefits, because of the potential for redistribution of resources. Many
have derided family law, including work against spousal abuse, as pro-
moting only "intraclass transfer of resources" among the poor.
3 6
& Poi- 237 (1994); Peter H. Rossi, Troubling Families: Family Homelessness in Amer-
ica, 37 AM. BEAviORA Scm~msr 342, 377 (1994); Joan Zorza, Woman Battering:
A Major Cause ofHomelessness, 25 CLERINGHOUSE REv. 420 (1991). Of course, do-
mestic violence is a world-wide, not merely a national, problem. See Rosemary
Ofeibea Ofei-Aboagye, Domestic Violence in Ghana: Some Initial Questions, in THE
PuBLIc NATURE OF PRiVATE VIOLENCE: THE DIsCOvERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, supra
note 22, at 260.
31. See Navarro v. Block, 72 E3d 712 (9th Cir. 1995) (plaintiffs' assertion that Los
Angeles County Sheriff violated equal protection clause by assigning lower priority
to 911 calls reporting domestic violence stared a daim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
32. See Mahoney, supra note 6, at 23.
33. See Cahn, supra note 6; cf Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic Wiolence, the Family, and the
Lauyering Process: Lessons From Studies on Gender Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM. L.Q.
247 (1993).
34. Cf Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law. Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IowA L. Rv.
1073 (1994) (discussing gender bias underlying federal court hostility to family law
issues).
35. For example, the Federal Violence Against Women Act of 1994, supra note 24,
allows survivors of domestic violence to bring civil rights suits in federal court.
36. See Abel, supra note 2, at 609. But see Violence Against Women Act of 1994, supra
note 24 (acknowledging the "importance of redressing sexual inequalities"). See also
KATz, supra note 20, at 40 ("By the 1950's, Legal Aid had become largely ... a
party to conflicts among the poor, largely in domestic-relations matters.").
(VCol, 3.:493
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This discounting of family law is misguided for two reasons. First,
the discounting of family law by the traditional left reflects a simplistic
view of power in the lives of poor women. The traditional left sees
power as operating one-dimensionally, with government, joined by the
market, as the oppressor." More sophisticated accounts of power suggest
that this view, while not wrong, is nonetheless incomplete.38 Poor
women experience oppression in a number of dimensions of their lives.
39
One dimension is the cruelty or indifference of government and the
market.40 Another dimension is gender inequality within poor communi-
ties, which government and the market do little or nothing to alleviate.
41
Traditional left accounts of poverty ignore this gendered dimension.
The second argument against the traditional left's discounting of
family law stems from the linkage of gender and poverty. As the femini-
zation of poverty demonstrates, gender inequality causes poverty in
America and the world. As noted earlier, domestic violence is the cause
of homelessness for fifty percent of all homeless women in the United
States.42 In addition, fear of domestic violence hinders women from
getting and keeping jobs.
43
Lawyering against domestic violence seeks to address these issues.
Lawyers can help survivors through a repertoire of methods, from
obtaining orders of protection against violence, to representing battered
women in divorce, custody, public assistance, housing, and criminal
defense matters. Additionally, lawyers can work with battered women's
organizations on governance, financing, and community development
issues.
Such a comprehensive approach has public ramifications because it
can help empower women, challenge gender inequality, and break the
cycle of women's poverty.
37. See Steven L. Wimter, The "Power" Thing (1995) (unpublished manuscript on file
with the author) (offering a post-modern, "four-dimensional" view of power informed
by the thought of Michel Foucault).
38. See Winter, supra note 37.
39. See Crenshaw, supra note 6.
40. See Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking "Wefare Dependency" from a Different
Ground, 81 GEO. LJ. 1961 (1993).
41. See Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 6.
42. See Mullins, supra note 30.
43. See Jason DeParle, Welfare Mothers Find Jobs Are Easier to Get Than Hold, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 1994, at Al.
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II. THE PROFESSIONAL/PERSONAL DICHOTOMY
Just as domestic violence lawyering challenges the public/private
dichotomy, it questions the opposition of the professional and the
personal. By "professional," this Article refers to a conception of the
lawyering role that stresses emotional detachment from clients, and that
views "winning" some kind of legal relief as the underlying goal of
representation.44 "Personal," on the other hand, refers to a conception
which values the affective ties between lawyer and client.
4 5
The breakdown of the professional and the personal in domestic
violence lawyering is a positive development resulting from three factors:
the proximity of many domestic violence lawyers to the experience of
domestic violence; the intermingling of an oppressive patriarchy and the
client's often deeply felt attachment to her batterer; and the trauma and
isolation experienced by the survivor. These interrelated factors make the
personal dimension central in domestic violence work. They also change
the main risk for the lawyer from betrayal of the client to over-identifica-
tion with the client.
The proximity-of-experience point is most clear. For many women
lawyers doing domestic violence work, the threat or the actuality of
domestic violence is a frighteningly real concern which necessarily
triggers identification with the client. This point is brought home in
Martha Mahoney's groundbreaking piece, Legal Images of Battered
Women, which tells stories of survivors of domestic violence."' Mahoney
acknowledges, "[o]ne of these stories is my own."47 Liz Schneider notes
44. Tony Kronman's vision of practical judgment, which hinges on the interaction of
sympathy and detachment, is a richer version of this view. See KRONMAN, supra note
8.
45. For a somewhat different argument that the conventional, detached view betrays the
interests of clients, see Jay S. Silver, Professionalism and the Hidden Assault on the
Adversarial System, 55 Oino ST. L J. 855 (1994) (arguing that criminal defense
lawyers be allowed to knowingly elicit perjured testimony from clients). The tensions
between detachment and solidarity in the public defender setting recently have
inspired thoughtful commentary. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications:
Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HALv. L. Ray. 1239 (1993);
Abbe Smith, Criminal Responsibility, Social Responsibility, and Angry Young Men:
Reflctions ofa Feminist CriminalDefense Layer, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
433 (1994-95); Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes to Law Schook The Clinical Education
of the Sensitive New Age Public Defender, 28 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Ra. 1 (1993).
46. See Mahoney, supra note 6.
47. Mahoney, supra note 6, at 8.
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that woman abuse "was something women experienced in our homes...
It happened to people in their personal lives."
48
This personal connection in domestic violence representation pushes
the boundaries between the personal and the professional. In most other
kinds of poverty law work, class issues separate attorneys from clients.
Most attorneys have never received AFDC, been evicted from their
homes, or filed for bankruptcy. While differences of class and race still
occasion alienation in domestic violence lawyering,4 9 the pervasive,
palpable risk of violence against women creates a potential source of
connection not present in most other kinds of poverty law.
50
This connection offers both promise and peril for domestic violence
lawyering. The promise lies in the fact that this connection combats the
pressure on the public interest lawyer to betray her client for a cause.
The risk of betrayal is most salient in impact litigation, 51 notably when
a defendant offers a settlement to a plaintiff. The settlement aids the
plaintiff but "moots out" the lawsuit. A lawyer who cares about her cause
but feels little personal connection to her client may use persuasive
techniques bordering on coercion, or disclose less about the proposed
settlement than is ethically appropriate, in order to secure the plaintiffs
continued cooperation.
5 2
48. Schneider et al., supra note 7, at 116. For a compelling account of how being both
a lawyer and a mother resonates with representing mothers in child welfare proceed-
ings, see Jane M. Spinak, Reflections on a Case (of Motherhood), 95 Co um. L. REv.
1990 (1995).
49. See Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 6.
50. For male lawyers doing domestic violence work, the challenge is greater. Men must
think their way into the experience of women, which is necessarily an incomplete and
imperfect endeavor. Men must also come to terms with the reality of domestic vio-
lence which they may have committed themselves. That understanding can help them
realize why domestic violence is a pervasive phenomenon.
51. See supra note 11.
52. Indeed, in one of this year's most bizarre episodes of political theater, the named
plaintiff in Roe v. Wade made just such a daim about her attorney. Cf "Jane Roe'
Joins Anti-Abortion Group, N.Y. Timas, Aug. 11, 1995 at A12 (discussing the
apparent change of heart of Norma McCorvey, the "Jane Doe" of Roe v. Wade, who
announced that she was joining Operation Rescue, and now opposed abortions after
the first trimester). Sarah Weddington, Ms. McCorvey's lawyer in Roe, did little to
demonstrate any connection with her client in her remarks about the incident,
asserting that "the case was not about her... the case was a class action." See David
Behrens, Change of Heart; 'Roe' of Roe vs. Wade Says Abortion Should Be Illegal
NEwsDAY, Aug. 11, 1995, at A5 (emphasis added). In a Nightline interview, Ms.
McCorvey asserted that Ms. Weddington should have told her more about the
possibility of getting an abortion in Mexico, which Ms. McCorvey said Ms.
Weddington herself had done. According to Ms. McCorvey, Ms. Weddington did
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The interests at stake are different, however, when domestic violence
survivors seek to drop requests for injunctions against abuse. On some
occasions, a client may in fact feel safer having dropped the request for
an injunction, or that the steps toward independence she has taken thus
far will help her cope with a relationship she does not wish to termi-
nate.53 In other cases, however, the client may be in denial about the
prospects for continued or intensified violence if she returns to the
abusive relationship. The lawyer may have good reason to believe, based
on her experience, what the client denies: that the client faces greater
danger upon her return."4
In these situations, a lawyer should not hesitate to make a personal
disclosure: that she will worry about the client if the client returns to the
batterer. The lawyer should make this disclosure for its own sake, to
reaffirm her connection with her client, and for the instrumental purpose
of getting the client to reconsider her decision. This disclosure is impor-
tant, even though the lawyer's invocation of personal sentiment for her
client goes beyond the traditional client-counseling model of neutral
recitation of risks and benefits.
Despite its trespassing beyond established lawyer roles, the lawyer's
invocation of her personal relationship with the client is not a betrayal
of the kind which arises in the impact litigation context. The lawyer's
expression of personal sentiment does not serve the interests of uniden-
tified others in a class or cause, as happens when the lawyer uses her
personal relationship to influence a client to stay the course in an impact
case. Rather, the lawyer is invoking her personal relationship to protect
the client from harm. This invocation of personal ties admittedly is
reinforced by the professional power of the lawyer over the client.55 The
lawyer is using her professional power not on a blank slate, however, but
on the overwhelming power of patriarchy, which has in part constructed
the client's views of "responsible" behavior within the family.56
not share this information because she was afraid an abortion for her dient would
moot out Roe v. Wade. See Nightline (ABC Television Broadcast, Aug. 10, 1995).
53. See Meier, supra note 6. Cf Jo Dixon, The Nexu of Sex, Spousal Violence, and the
State, 29 LAw & Soc'y Ray. 359, 371-72 (1995) (arguing that "women who file but
later drop charges are not passive but are engaging in a rational power strategy as
they attempt to manage conjugal violence").
54. See Mahoney, supra note 6, at 66.
55. See Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 18.
56. I am indebted to Joan Meier for refining this point. Cf. Mahoney, supra note 6, at
38 (noting courts' view that a survivor of domestic violence may return to her abuser
because "she may believe that her children need a father" (citing Fennell v. Goolsby,
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By warning her client against returning to the abuser, the lawyer's
action here clashes with the conventional view that the lawyer's respon-
sibility is to uphold the client's wishes, not to protect her safety.
57
Lawyers typically leave the latter concern to the helping professions, such
as social work. Yet, when the power of patriarchy unduly influences the
client's wishes, the distinction between legal neutrality and helping breaks
down.
This is not to deny that connection has risks in domestic violence
lawyering. While the pervasive risk for impact litigators is betrayal of
clients, the defining risk in domestic violence lawyering is over-identifi-
cation with survivors of domestic violence. 51 Over-identification can often
lead the lawyer to equate the client's interests with the client's success in
living apart from her abusive partner.
The problem with a lawyer viewing her client's living apart from an
abuser as "success" is that this view discounts the value survivors place
on intimate relationships, including relationships with abusive partners.
Many domestic violence survivors retain emotional attachments to their
batterers. 5 In addition, survivors' attachment to their children is a central
factor. A child's nightly question, "Where's daddy?" will dampen even
the most stalwart survivor's resolve. A lawyer focused solely on the
630 F. Supp. 451, 456 (E.D. Pa. 1985)). Martha Fineman argues that the view of
fatherhood as "foundational" for the family is itself an artifact of patriarchy. See
FmiNjmA, supra note 16, at 113. While the equation of fatherhood and patriarchy is
compelling, it may not persuade a mother who has heard from her children about
how much they "miss their daddy." This intermingling of gender inequality and
affective relationships is another example of the merging of the professional and
personal in domestic violence lawyering. See supra notes 44-55 and accompanying
text.
57. See Margulies, supra note 6.
58. See Meier, supra note 6, at 1349-56 (discussing phenomenon of counter-transference,
in which professionals identify too strongly with dients).
59. See Meier, supra note 6, at 1352; Mills, supra note 6. One example of the durability
of these ties is the recent trial of Warren Moon, the Minnesota Vikings quarterback,
who was charged with spousal abuse, specifically scratching, hitting, and choking his
wife, Felicia. Prosecutors had to compel Felicia Moon to testify under a new state
law. On the stand, Ms. Moon said that she had been at fault in the incident. A jury
took less than half an hour to acquit her husband. The defendant's lawyer, noting
that the couple had been together for almost 25 years, since they were both 16 years
old, told the jury, "This is a love story, folks, not an assault." Kate Murphy, Jury
Rapidly Acquits Moon of SpousalAbuse Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1996, at B12.
A photograph of the scene in the courtroom immediately after the verdict, capturing
Felicia Moon's tearful relief and exhilaration, testifies to the intermingling of affective
ties with abuse that makes many domestic violence cases so difficult. Murphy, supra.
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importance of the client's separation from her abuser will fail to appreci-
ate the role such attachments play in the lives of survivors. This failure
in turn increases the risk that the lawyer will blame her clients when they
return to abusive relationships" and reject them when they need her help
again.
The dilemma for lawyers doing domestic violence work is that they
cannot fully represent a client without subjecting themselves to the risk
of over-identification, since the emotional and physical effects of violence
on survivors make "getting personal" the most effective way to reach the
client.6 ' Commentators have recognized the trauma suffered by domestic
violence survivors, drawing connections between domestic violence,
terrorism, and torture.62 What might seem like professional detachment
in other situations can appear to a survivor to be studied bureaucratic
indifference. Developing rapport with a domestic violence survivor is
necessary for getting information and requires that a lawyer express
allegiance with her client.63 In other words, when a client expresses guilt
about leaving an abitsive relationship and in the process separating her
children from their father, the lawyer should be prepared to say, "you
did the right thing."
With this declaration, the lawyer also assumes a role necessary for
combatting the survivor's isolation: the role of witness.64 To emerge from
the "private realm," the survivor must tell her story. Otherwise, like
victims of more visible scourges, 65 she risks oblivion. Telling her story to
60. See Meier, supra note 6, at 1352.
61. See Margulies, supra note 6.
62. See Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as
Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291 (1994); Marcus, supra note 22.
63. See Stephen Ellmann, Empathy and Approval 43 HATNGS L.J. 991 (1992).
64. This theme is echoed in MIuNR S. BAIL, THE WoRD AND THE LAw (1993). See also
Milner S. Ball, Jurisprudence From Below: First Notes, 61 TENN. L. REv. 747, 764
(1994); Clark D. Cunningham, Sometimes You Can't Make a Dent, But They Know
You've Been There: The Lawyer as God's Witness, 106 HALv. L. REv. 1962 (1993)
(reviewing MILqER S. BAL., THE WoRD AND THE LAw, (1993)); Peter Margulies,
Progressive Lawyers and Lost Traditions, supra note 18 (reviewing Ball's book and
ANTHoNY T. KRoN AN, THE LOST LAwRva FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFES-
SION (1993)).
The vision of lawyer as witness is also important in other countries. See Raymond
J. Michalowski, Between Citizens and the Socialist State: The Negotiation of Legal
Practice in Socialist Cuba, 29 LAw & Soc'y REy. 65, 87 (1995) (quoting a Cuban
lawyer working in a law collective who observes that, "[A] large part of my work is
just being someone my clients can talk with about their problems.").




even one other person allows the client to affirm her humanity-the very
quality the batterer seeks to extinguish in his quest for control. This af-
firmation is inherently a form of political action,66 even though it
involves a personal revelation, and, in the context of a conversation with
a lawyer, a revelation in the course of communications to a professional.
Having told her story to the lawyer, the survivor of domestic
violence may not follow up with action of a more instrumental kind. She
may not seek an injunction against further violence. Alternatively, if she
has sought an injunction, she may seek to vacate it. A client's decision
not to follow up does not render the lawyer's effort to listen useless from
a professional point of view. As Hannah Arendt notes about the Holo-
caust, when there are witnesses, "nothing can ever be 'practically useless,'
at least, not in the long run."67 The witnessed story persists as an eman-
cipatory moment in the survivor's remembrance, suggesting that things
can be different. A survivor may need to gather many such moments
together over time to achieve independence, if that is her goal. But a
lawyer can help most effectively by placing less priority on short-term
professional goals-did her client keep the injunction in place?-and
more priority on witnessing the survivor's slow, painful, and uncertain
process of empowerment.
Consider the story of "Anna Novo," another client of the St.
Thomas Immigration Clinic. Ms. Novo, who was from Thailand, had
married a United States citizen. After prolonged psychological and
physical abuse by her husband, she left with the two children from the
marriage. Many members of the Thai community, including potential
employers, said she caused the problem, because she "talked back" to her
husband. Indeed, to many members of the Thai community, Ms. Novo's
leaving her husband denoted a kind of insanity. Her husband, with
whom she maintained contact, said the same thing. Ms. Novo felt
powerless in the face of this pervasive disapproval. The Immigration
Clinic worked with Ms. Novo in 1994 to obtain an injunction against
her husband that, among other relief, barred him from committing
further abuse and awarded her custody of the children. On the way out
of the courthouse, Ms. Novo turned to the students in the clinic, and
asserted, "Now, I have power."
66. Research on feminism and the civil rights movement suggests that personal ties can
precipitate political action. See Kathleen B. Jones, Citizenship in a Woman-Friendly
Polity, 15 SIGNs 781, 807-11 (1990); Doug McAdam & Ronnelle Paulsen, Specifying
the Relationship between Social Ties and Activism, 99 Am. J. Soc. 640 (1993).
67. HANNAH ARENDT, EicamANs IN JERUSALEM 233 (Viking ed. 1964).
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The clinic's latest contact with Ms. Novo matches the affirmation
of that moment at the courthouse, but only after some twists and turns
along the way. On a positive note, Ms. Novo received a battered spouse
waiver from the Immigration and Naturalization Service which led to her
obtaining lawful permanent resident status in the United States. But Ms.
Novo, like many survivors of domestic violence, also asked the clinic to
vacate the injunction she had obtained against her husband. Subsequent-
ly, her husband was granted a divorce and custody of their children,
based on his fraudulent representations to a court in another state. Mr.
Novo, who previously had been convicted of kidnapping children from
a prior marriage, planned to change the names of his and Anna's chil-
dren and take them to Costa Rica. At the last moment, the lawyers who
were helping Ms. Novo with her divorce and custody problems secured
an injunction barring Mr. Novo from leaving the country. Mr. Novo
was arrested, and Ms. Novo and her children were reunited.
It is tempting to dismiss Ms. Novo's moment of self-assertion at the
courthouse in light of the events that followed. One could conclude that
Ms. Novo surrendered her power when she had the first injunction
vacated. Such a dismissal, however, would privilege a short-term, nar-
rowly instrumental perspective on lawyering over a perspective which
integrates instrumental and affective concerns over time. Ms. Novo's
story to date suggests that, despite the provisional nature of her moment
of power at the courthouse, the experience was nonetheless crucial. In
the bleak days which followed Mr. Novo's kidnapping of their children,
that moment, no less than the more tangible benefit of lawful permanent
resident status, showed that power can flow in more than one direction.
This destabilization of hierarchy made Ms. Novo's ultimate empower-
ment possible.
68
III. THE IMPACT LITIGATION/CLIENT SERVICE DICHOTOMY
Lawyering against domestic violence breaks down the impact
litigation/client service distinction in public interest law. This dichotomy,
like the public/private and professional/personal dichotomies, privileges
detachment over connection. In addition, like the others, the im-
pact/service dichotomy has a gender subtext.
68. See Nancy Fraser, Struggle Over Needs: Outline of a Socialist-Feminist Critical Theory




The gender subtext emerges because of the salience of family law as
a source of service work. While service work can arise in any substantive
area, including public benefits, housing, or consumer law, commentators
typically have linked family law practice with the stereotype of service
work as routine and apolitical.69 Commentators have critiqued family law
as being apolitical because of its supposed tendency to produce "intraclass
transfer of resources" from poor men to poor women.70
While poverty law programs have always done a significant amount
of family law, a traditional concern among poverty lawyers is that family
law does not lend itself to an impact case agenda.7'1 This view holds that
such individual service work is not merely apolitical, but is also counter-
productive, draining resources away from impact work.72 Since the
1960s, the preferred method of dealing with this problem has been to
separate service work from impact work bureaucratically by establishing
specialized centers focusing on impact work in centralized, "downtown"
locations, while leaving the service component to neighborhood offices.73
The geographic and functional separation of specialized impact
litigation offices and service offices is an apt metaphor for two other
kinds of detachment. First is poverty law's detachment from other
disciplines, particularly the "helping professions" such as social work.
Second is the lawyers' detachment from clients. Each of these separations
has robbed poverty law of empowering sources of connection.
Such separations reflect an exaggerated belief in the efficacy of
changing "the law on the books" in the emancipation of subordinated
groups.74 The lawyers in the century's most significant impact case, Brown
v. Board of Education," did not hold to this view; they recognized that
litigation, interdisciplinary collaboration, and community organization had
69. See, e.g., Abel, supra note 2, at 609.
70. See, e.g., Abel, supra note 2, at 609.
71. See Abel, supra note 2, at 566, n.565 and accompanying text.
72. Cf Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lauyering and Street-Level
Bureaucracy, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 947, 953 (1992) (analyzing attitudes about trade-offs
in poverty law practice).
73. See Bellow, The LegalAid Experience, supra note 5. Of course, this separation had
antecedents decades older than the 1960's, including most notably the NAACP
lawyers who ultimately formed the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.
74. See Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lauyering for the Poor, 56
BRooc. L. Rav. 861 (1990).
75. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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to proceed together.76 However, the 1960s poverty lawyers focus on "New
Property" rights to public benefits, the trend toward specialized law reform
offices which did no service work, and the chilling effect of Legal Services
Corporation guidelines in the 1970s impeded the coordination of
litigation, interdisciplinary collaboration, and community mobilization.77
The procedural safeguards won by welfare recipients in the "New
Property" cases such as Goldberg v. Kelly,78 together with the rational-
ization of anti-poverty programs away from hands-on social worker
practice,79 made interdisciplinary collaborations more difficult in anti-
poverty work. The development of separate offices for law reform
litigation dovetailed with the critique of caring professions in the "New
Property" movement-in part a reaction to the overreaching of social
workers, with their midnight searches and "man in the house" rules.80
For the "New Property" poverty lawyers, social work was a form of
social control. Establishing legal rights for welfare recipients was a way
to break the power of the social work discipline over the lives of people
in poverty. Collaboration with social workers and other members of the
"caring" disciplines was viewed as a step backward."1
The geographic and functional separation of impact work from
client service work also led to detachment from clients. In the rarefied
atmosphere of law reform offices, lawyers became used to thinking of
the client abstractly, as a "source of issues." 2 Lawyers who reduce
clients to mere sources of issues do not have to spend much time with
76. African-American school teachers were a vital constituency for the NAACP's legal
campaign against segregation. See MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LECAL STRATEGY
AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-I95o, 42-43 (1987). In addition, Kenneth
Clark's testimony in the desegregation cases about his famous doll experiments, in
which African-American children preferred white dolls to Black dolls, is still the most
prominent use of social science in law. See JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER,
SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 138-40 (1994).
77. See Margulies, supra note 6.
78. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
79. See William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MARY-
LAND L. Rav. 1, 28 (1985); William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in
the Welfare System, 92 YAiL L.J. 1198 (1983).
80. See DAvis, supra note 20, at 84-86.
81. Cf Martha Minow, Learning from Experience: The Impact of Research About Family
Support Programs on Public Policy, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 221, 241-47 (1994) (analyz-
ing concerns about intrusiveness of current "home visiting" programs which offer
hands-on assistance to mothers living in poverty).
82. See Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 12, at 362.
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their clients. As a result, the "immediate, personal aspects of the lawyer-
client relationship that are basic to providing legal or any other human
service" 3 become a distraction; they "cause delay and make things 'too
messy."'
84
This wariness toward clients obscures the fact that, while changing
the law on the books is crucial, it is only a first step. Intensive service
work, which Gary Bellow described almost twenty years ago as a "fo-
cused case" strategy, 5 is necessary to vindicate a legal right established
on the books. Service work must complement partnerships with social
service agencies and activists.
This is particularly true when vindication of a legal right defies a
ubiquitous paradigm, such as patriarchy. This paradigm embodies
negative images of women, that work from the inside out, undermining
women's self-worth. Patriarchy derives power not just from law but also
from discourse in families, our smallest units of social life.
Within the family, gender inequality seems so natural that we
frequently do not recognize it.16 It manifests itself in "routine" family
decisions about responsibility for child care, cleaning, and food. Similar-
ly, the struggle against domestic violence challenges practices viewed by
men and women throughout the world as "the way things are, and the
way that things will always be."87 Women who resist, like Anna Novo,
88
are viewed as insane. The power of patriarchy is such that even women
who resist often share that view.
Because of this power, changing the ideology of patriarchy, as
opposed to the law on the books, requires attention to each case in
which a batterer challenges the credibility and resolve of a domestic
violence survivor. Only attention to each case can support the con-
sciousness and mobilization which an initial "impact" victory triggers.8 9
83. Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 12, at 362.
84. L6PEz, supra note 18, at 15.
85. See Bellow, supra note 5, at 121-22.
86. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENcE 237-38 (1990).
87. Ofei-Aboagye, supra note 30, at 262.
88. See supra pp. 507-08.
89. "[Ut is meaningless to win a principle and then not vindicate it with lawyers ....
There are countless laws on the books today that are beautiful in their symmetry
... that don't mean a thing because there are no lawyers to vindicate them."
Harold Rothwax, Address at Proceedings of the Harvard Conference on Law and
Poverty, 63-64 (Mar. 17-19, 1967) (quoted in DAvis, supra note 20, at 35).
Harold Rothwax succeeded poverty law pioneer Ed Sparer as head of New York
City's MFY Legal Unit, the oldest federally-funded legal services program in the
country.
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Every domestic violence representation which reinforces the credibility
and resolve of a survivor is another step toward supplanting patriarchy
with a more emancipatory way of life.90 This work is not easy. Howev-
er, as Anna-Novo's case demonstrates, patriarchy's constitutive role in
cultural norms and relationships with loved ones makes a personal
approach imperative.
The domestic violence movement was built on this personal ap-
proach to social change. A central virtue of the movement has been its
grounding in the experience of survivors, and its continued commit-
ment to matching litigation with mobilization and interdisciplinary
work.91 Groups such as AYUDA, 92 in Washington, D.C., have com-
bined legal advocacy and community organization. In AYUDA's
Hermanas Unidas (Sisters United) program, battered immigrant women
form groups to help each other solve problems.93 The provision of
social services in domestic violence shelters and other sites complements
this community mobilization by offering survivors resources to fight the
social isolation which fuels violence against women.9 While lawyers for
domestic violence survivors are not immune to the lure of a narrow,
legalistic approach, 95 their connection with their clients makes it easier
to correct for a legalistic bias. As a result, lawyers for survivors are more
likely to view legal rights, community organization, and interdisciplinary
collaboration as "interdependent." 96 This interdependence is crucial for
truly political lawyering.
90. I am indebted to Louise Trubek for helping me crystallize this point. See Sally E.
Merry, Resistance and the Cultural Power of Law, 29 LAw & Soc'y Ray. 11, 19
(1995); cf. Winter, supra note 37 (interpreting the work of Michel Foucault).
91. See Schneider, Rights and Politics, supra note 6, at 647. For an essay on the interac-
tion of litigation and community organization, see Lucie E. White, To Learn and
Teach: Lessons fiom Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 Wis. L. Rav. 699.
92. See Stacy Brustin, Expanding Our Vision of Legal Services Representation-The
Hermanas Unidas Project, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L 39 (1993).
93. See Brustin, supra note 92. For a discussion of mutual aid efforts abroad, see Betty
H. Morrow, A Grass-Roots Feminist Response to Intimate Violence in the Caribbean,
17 WoMEN's STUD. INT'L F. 579 (1994) (analyzing role of Women's Coalition of
St. Croix).
94. See Joan T. Pennell, Ideology at a Canadian Shelter for Battered Women: A Recon-
struction, 10 WOMEN'S STUD. IN 'L F. 113, 119 (1987). But see Fraser, supra note
68, at 213-15 (arguing that professionalization of battered women's shelters has
shifted focus from issues of gender oppression and socio-economic deprivation to
self-esteem of "client").
95. See Meier, supra note 6.




While lawyer-client connections can empower clients, they also
disrupt professional routines. Cynics will argue that self-interest, rather
than concern for clients, has established detachment as a professional
norm. Domestic violence lawyering demonstrates the importance of
transcending role limitations.
Detachment engenders the three dichotomies discussed here. It
fosters engagement with the public realm of rationality and neglect of
the private realm of emotion. It thereby neglects the way in which
public norms construct the private realm's gender inequality. Detach-
ment also posits a separation of professional judgment and personal
commitment that fails to meet the needs of vulnerable clients. Finally,
detachment privileges the abstractions embodied in law on the books, at
issue in impact litigation, over client service work's accumulation of
small victories on the ground.
The small victories of domestic violence lawyering, such as the
victory of Anna Novo,97 reveal the artificiality of these dichotomies. In
the realm of law on the books, Ms. Novo lacked impact. Yet in the
more concrete realm of violence against women, Ms. Novo accom-
plished much. Like all battered immigrant women, she exemplified the
influence of the public sphere of immigration law on the private sphere
of the family. Breaking down the public/private dichotomy also in-
volved bridging the professional/personal divide: the legal representation
of Ms. Novo required not only standard professional skills of drafting
and advocacy, but also the empathy of the lawyer as witness. A parallel
bridge links impact litigation and service work. While Ms. Novo made
no new law, her resistance to patriarchy demonstrated the possibility of
emancipation. With an ideology as pervasive as patriarchy, each demon-
stration is a political act.
The political content of domestic violence work in turn demon-
strates the ultimate futility of conservative attacks on legal services for
the poor. Conservatives seek to silence political lawyering for the poor
by hobbling impact litigation, even as these same conservatives promote
political lawyering by the rich by delegating legislative drafting to
lobbyists and high-powered law firms.98 However, as Ralph Reed of the
97. See supra pp. 507-08.
98. See, e.g., Stephen Engelberg, Conflict of Interest is Cited in Regulatory Bill Lobbying,
N.Y. Tudas, Apr. 5, 1995, at A23 (describing how a major law firm, on behalf of
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Christian Coalition acknowledges with his assertion that family law
legal services practice subsidizes divorce, 99 decimating impact litigation
will not put an end to political lawyering for poor people.
Political lawyering for the poor will survive because politics, as a
bridging of public and private, and professional and personal, emerges
with every small victory in domestic violence representation and in
other legal services for people living in poverty. The cumulative, low-
visibility character of these victories may in fact be salutary, as camou-
flage in our current unforgiving climate. Witnesses to such victories
should recognize them as emblems of hope for an emancipatory sea-
change to come.' t
corporate clients, assisted in drafting legislation curbing the federal government's
authority to regulate business, while one of the firm's lawyers testified before
Congress on the measure as a spokesperson for the American Bar Association).
99. See supra p. 494 and note 4.
100. See HANNAH ARENDT, Walter Benjamin, in MEN IN DAR TIMES 153, 193-206
(1955); cf DAVID LuBAN, Difrence Made LegaL The Court and Dr. King, in LEGAL.
MODERNISM 209, 209, 273 (1994) (discussing how Walter Benjamin's "conception
of the present as ... shot through with chips of Messianic time" describes the civil
rights movement's impetus for social change (citing WALTER BENJAMIN, Theses on
the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONs 253, 263 (Hannah Arendt ed. & Harry
Zohn trans., 1969))).
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